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ABSTRACT

considered to be the initial estimate. Some pro
grams are tracked against the initial contract value,
others from the congressional commitment made
at the time the program is approved, and others
to early Phase A and Phase B estimates.

Growth in costs and schedules of aerospace
projects is all too commonplace. Within NASA,
about 70% of cost growth is attributed to under
estimation of technical difficulty, 20% to major
scope changes and 10% to external impacts.
Schedule duration has increased by 50% over the
last 15 years. Most growth problems can be
traced to incomplete Phase A/B requirements
definition, coupled with the resulting incom
plete cost estimates.

Anyway, many of these accusations of large cost
growths are all too true. Aerospace "new start"
program managers seem to eternally believe they
can do the impossible in providing high tech
products in record time at garage sale prices.
Nevermind that similar programs took twice as
long and cost twice as much. This time "we are
going to do it differently", "we will freeze the
design early and allow no changes", "we will cut
out the fat", etc. So they say, but somehow in the
real program execution it never seems to work
out that way.

NLS must be a cost effective, low cost transporta
tion system to be viable. To achieve this goal a
cost containment system is required which forces
cost, technical and schedule to function'together
interlocked in a controlled management system.
INTRODUCTION
Cost growth in aerospace programs seems to be
the norm these days. Hardly a week goes by
without some news article detailing a horror
story on a space project involving large cost
growth and schedule slips, often coupled with
poor technical performance and perhaps even a
hint of an attempted cover-up of the matter.
These stories imply NASA, DOD and aerospace
contractors can not or will not manage their
resources effectively.
A recent study by the Federation of American
Scientists indicates the average space project cost 2
1/2 times as much as promised and was 58% behind
schedule. My data base generally supports these
factors, however, much depends on what is

Once the program begins, the overzealous claims
are quickly overtaken by the grim realities of
program turbulence, technical complexities, in
terfaces, personnel turnover, changing budget
priorities and emerging requirements. The inevi
table growth in problems, weights, requirements,
manpower, costs and schedules, coupled with
reduction in margins, performance and planned
capabilities has lead to many cost reduction ideas
and techniques.
None of these "cure alls" really attack the root
cause of cost growth as we will discuss later.
Nevertheless, many techniques have come to the
forefront as cost reduction tools. In fact, it seems
as though a new one is invented everyday. Some
of these concepts currently in usage are displayed
in Figure 1.
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instruments known early and remained
constant
5. Proposed improvements over the basic
design and capabilities were not accepted.

Total Quality Management
Financial Farsightedness
Taquchi Method
Factory of the Future
Design To Cost
Continuous Process Improvement
Technology Advancement
Automation/Robotics
Culture Changes
Quality Functional Deployment
Concurrent Engineering
Skunk Works
Should Cost
Operability Focus
Just-In-Time Delivery
Ship and Shoot
Platform Teams

These reasons could be called TQM or the like,
but it seems more like common sense and techno
logical conservatism that did the trick and, of
course, maybe luck.

Figure 1. Samples of Current Cost
Reduction Concepts
While each of these has cost saving potential,
they must be pursued vigorously and continu
ally if any actual savings are to materialize. They
must be undertaken with management convic
tion which lasts throughout the program. None of
these are easy, some have significant up-front costs,
most require personnel training and all require con
stant monitoring and evaluation. They represent a
management commitment to invest in the present
for greater rewards in the future.
One recent success story was the Upper Atmo
sphere Research Satellite (UARS) which was
launched this past September and stayed within
its $630M budget. Program officials offered the
following reasons for good programmatic per
formance:
1. Use of off-the-shelf hardware
2. Initially planned 4 satellite program re
duced early on to a single satellite launch
3. Spacecraft design based on a design that
had been used before
4. Interfaces between spacecraft and
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Other space programs, such as Space Station,
Earth Observing System (EOS), New Launch Sys
tem (NLS) and Space Exploration Initiative (SEI),
which initially promised all things to all people
appear doomed to major down scoping, delayed
starts and price tags larger than the Congress will
support. The Space Station's initial technical
content and advertised $8 billion cost were to
tally incompatible from the start. This has kept
the program in internal conflict as it has tried to
do too much with too little. The downsizing and
program rescoping has cost millions and years
which could have been more prudently applied
to a Space Station whose cost and design were
congruent.
COST GROWTH
Space projects have never been without cost
growth, but this growth has increased over the
years in number and percent. Figure 2 indicates
the average percent cost growth for 20 NASA
projects launched in the 1970's and for 18 post1980 projects. The judged cost increases associ
ated with the Challenger accident have been
removed from the applicable projects to normal
ize the data. Major reasons for the cost growth are
(1) underestimate oftheprogram difficulty (complexi
ties, design requirements, interfaces, schedule) 70%,
(2) major scope changes 20%, and (3) external impacts
(constrained budget, Congress) 10%.
Part of this increase in cost growth is due to a slow
culture change in NASA. NASA now has much
less in-house technical capability and has be
come older, more conservative and is less willing
to accept risk or failure. It has lost the boundless

contingencies or reserves. I recently added on a
major addition to my house. At the outset, I made
a detailed cost estimate using the best, most
reliable data possible. After all, people have been
adding on to their houses for thousands of years
so the task appeared simple. A line by line
estimate was compiled using vendor quotes, in
puts from knowledgeable tradespeople, rules of
thumb and actual hardware prices. To this I
initially added a 30% cost contingency, but as my
planning list grew the dollar total exceeded my
budget so I was forced to cut back contingencies
to 10%. After the work was complete I compared
my estimate to the actual costs line by line. As it
turned out I was extremely close (2-3%) on every
item which I had estimated. The problem was
that there were a large number of items required
which I, at the outset, had no idea I needed and
had made no estimate for. These more than
consumed my meager contingency and made for
an overrun. Fortunately it did not make the
newspaper headlines.

Judged Cost Increases due to Challenger
Accident are Excluded
100-,

95%

External
Impact 10%
/fajor Scope
Changes
20%

80_

53%

1
Pre-1980
Projects

Difficulty
derestimate
70%

Post-1980
Projects

Figure 2. Past and Current Cost Growth
Trends in NASA
enthusiasm and air of excitement that was exhib
ited by its personnel in the 1960s. NASA projects
are now more encumbered with bureaucratic
processes, documentation, and reporting systems
which add cost and manpower. Technology
advancements have offset these cost increases to
a degree, but not enough to turn the trend around.
For example, in today's dollars, the development
cost of Space Shuttle's SSME engine was about
30% greater than either of Saturn V's F-l or J-2
engines. The explanation was that the SSME was
considerably more technically demanding. Now,
however, the new STME which purports to be a
return to a simpler, less technically demanding,
low cost system is expected to have the same
development cost as the SSME.
The seemly inevitable aerospace cost growth
clearly makes the case for adequate program cost
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The point is there is no way to totally quantify the
unknown. No matter how much you spend in
planning there will still be unexpected discover
ies in the execution phase. (Incidentally, a later
Figure will address this point.) The bottom line is
that a reasonable cost contingency (20-30%) in a
space program is a must. It is a place holder for the
unknown. It is not an optional item "which will
get spent up if you include it" — it will get spent
regardless! But at dire consequences to the pro
gram if it was not included.
SCHEDULE GROWTH
Aerospace projects also now take considerably
longer to develop which account for part of the
increased cost. Figure 3 indicates the enormous
growth in development time for NASA space
crafts. The schedule slips associated with the
Challenger accident have been removed from
this data. Nevertheless, average development time
has increased by 50% in the past fifteen years. The
UARS, mentioned earlier, actually was proposed

Judged Schedule Effects of the
Challenger Accident are Excluded.

in 1978 and took 13 years to gain approval, be
built and launched — four years longer than it
took to go to the moon.

9_

Another example of schedule slips and cost
growth is the Skylab Program Payloads chart
shown in Figure 4. This actual data is more un
real looking than any hypothetical illustration I
could have created. The actual cost expenditure
is plotted along with some 15 NASA Program
Operating Plan (POP) requirements over time.
There are several trends here that are typical of
most space projects. First, in the early years it is
usually not possible to spend all the money allo
cated because of the delays in getting organized
and hiring and training personnel. Second, in the
later part of a program it is easy to over spend
because of the difficulty of getting people off the
program. Lastly, the slow ramp-up causes sched
ule stretch out and cost growth.
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Figure 3. NASA Development Time Trends

Figure 4. Comparison of NASA POP Requirements to Actual Cost for Skylab Program Payloads
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PRIMARY COST GROWTH CAUSE

stage for cost containment. These are:

The causes of cost growth — internal and exter
nal, technical and management, foreseeable and
totally unforeseeable —are innumerable. But the
primary root cause, I believe, is incomplete technical
definition early on. This leads to requirements
understatement; incomplete and inaccurate cost
and schedule estimating, and program redi
rection, growth and downsizing as previously
unknown requirements surface. Figure 5 indi
cates that funds spent in the definition phase can
have tremendous payoff in total program cost
savings. This plot, with some 25 NASA data
points, indicates that if 8-10% of the total pro
gram cost is invested in Phase A/B definition,
total program growth is held to around 30%
above the final Phase B estimate. Spending more
dollars and effort on definition seems to offer
little payoff, but spending less definitely has a
very significant impact on the program total cost.
A number of very important actions should oc
cur during the critical definition period to set the

1. Actual user needs are solicited and
accomodated.
2. Bona fide requirements established.
3. A workable, conservative preliminary
design developed with margins.
4. A streamlined, astute management struc
ture formulated.
5. A total program plan developed.
6. A realistic and inclusive cost baseline esti
mate made.
If these are done well, the battle for cost containment
is half won.
The other half of the battle is to (1) resolutely
maintain this baseline and not to let the better
become the enemy of the good; (2) establish and
utilize powerful management systems which pro
vide program status, tracking, control and sound
basis for timely corrective actions as required;
and (3) instill within the total government and
contractor workforce a desire, a will, a motiva
tion to do things right the first time — on time
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Figure 5. NASA Phase A/B Definition Investment versus Program Total Cost Growth from the
Final Phase B Cost Estimate.
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with minimum expenditure of resources. Some
programs have this technical and management
pride, this drive for excellence — many do not.
NLS COST CONTAINMENT
Enough background and preaching on causes of
cost growth. What can be realistically done in the
NLS program to contain cost and avoid the tur
moil associated with other programs? Already
there are forces at work which cause the NLS new
start grief. These include the massive federal
budget deficit, the severe domestic economic
recession, the major perturbations of other pro
grams within NASA and DOD, the election year,
the lack of strong NLS "users'' or proponents, the
uncertain NLS technical baseline and the already
advertised $10.7 to $12.2 billion DDT&E cost.
NLS is being touted as cost-effective and offering
low cost transportation. In fact, this has become
a major thrust of the NLS new-start justification
and these claims must be addressed in a persua
sive and business like manner.
On the one hand, the Space Shuttle is a very
expensive system to operate and the Titan IV is
technologically antiquated in many ways. There
fore, it would seem logical that a new system
could easily beat both of them in cost per flight
and cost per pound delivered. Especially if that
new vehicle was, in fact, a system with common
hardware, facilities, manpower and management
for a family of vehicles with different payload
capabilities.
On the other hand, if the new vehicle has de
manding and costly requirements placed on it
such as engine out, two separate launch com
plexes, engine separation system, advanced avi
onics, Shuttle compatible payload bay, STS heri
tage, man-rateable, etc., then suddenly its com
petitive advantage is greatly diminished. The
present STS and Titan IV vehicles — costly or
antiquated as they are — don't require major
DDT&E money nor are they that inefficient in
operations cost by comparison to NLS, especially
if projected launch rates are modest. The STS
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operations cost reduction effort, which is now
underway here and at other NASA centers, is
intended to reduce STS operations cost 3% per
year for 5 years or $1.8 billion overall. These
efficiencies will surely be applicable to NLS as
well. They also free up money which hopefully
can be applied to a NLS new start.
W. Edward Denning, the father of TQM, says "If
you always do what you 've always done, you '// always
get what you always got/' Clearly we must do
something different if we are to make NLS a
reality. For NLS to attain congressional and
national approval, it must show technical and
cost advantages over the present launch systems.
I will leave the technical superiority discussion to
others and concentrate on the cost justification.
NLS must be capable of providing low cost trans
portation for payloads and yet achieve this aim
within a DDT&E budget which will surely be
constrained both in total and year-by-year costs.
To fulfill this difficult goal, NASA and the Air Force
must put major emphasis on cost containment and
adopt a new development culture where (1) the cost
impact of every program decision is carefully weighted
before implementation, (2) where low operating costs
drive every design trade, and (3) where NLS manage
ment make design and program architecture converge
on costs rather than vice versa.
I envision a NLS cost containment system which
would be an interactive process forcing cost, tech
nical and schedule to function together, inter
locked in a controlled and viable management
system. While "zero cost growth" is not possible,
"cost containment" within acceptable bounds is
an achievable management goal. NLS which
involves many program elements, centers, con
tractors and a NASA/Air Force partnership, has
unforeseens and unknowns which can not be
totally anticipated. Even with descoping of tech
nical requirements, schedule adjustments and
cost contingencies, some cost growth is likely.
With an integrated cost containment plan fully
supported by NLS management, such cost growth
can be minimized and contained. This managed
containment will permit a viable NLS program to
proceed in a very cost effective manner.

STEPS TO NLS COST CONTAINMENT

operability focused. Critics of NLS would say
that neither of these keystones are presently in
place. Now is the time to focus on these two areas
in sufficient detail to allow the program to move
through what has almost become a "go-no go"
gate. This baseline provides the basis for detailed
and realistic schedule and cost estimates. Obvi
ously this is an iterative task with many trades
performed to insure that NLS requirements are
cost optimized. Appropriate design margins
must be included and the operations and user
impacts of requirements and preliminary design
work must be given the highest priority. Cost
analysts and designers must work closely to
gether in a proactive environment. Mission
success should continue to be the primary em
phasis, but with a proper balance of schedule and
cost considerations. Contingency plans should
be developed at the outset for each program
element that would allow for fall-back positions
in the event technical problems or budgetary
ceilings are encountered that impact established
technical, schedule or cost baselines.

The proposed cost containment framework con
sists of five key steps as shown in Figure 6.
1. Establish the baseline program.
2. Establish cost targets and contingen
cies.
3. Establish cost containment manage
ment systems.
4. Perform tracking, analyses and evalu
ation.
5. Make timely, informed decisions.
Figure 6. Five Steps to Cost Containment
The approach for NLS cost containment is an
evolutionary process starting with program defi
nition and continuing through design, develop
ment and operations. Cost containment can best
be achieved through a systematic approach for
establishing meaningful and achievable techni
cal, schedule, and cost baselines and the effective
integration and implementation of this program.
The NLS cost containment system is obviously
considerably more involved than can be detailed
in this short paper. Many on-line, existing
mangement systems would be utilized, although
in a more coupled and dynamic manner; several
new systems would be introduced; more empha
sis would be placed on cost and schedule estimat
ing; techniques such as risk assessments, trend
and variance analyses, action tracking and inde
pendent evaluations would be used to a greater
degree; and fall-back and alternate solutions
would be developed ahead of any need. In
summary fashion, the five steps to achieve the
NLS cost containment goal are explained below.
(1) Establish the baseline program
The crucial program definition work cited earlier
must be done for NLS. Requirements definition
and preliminary design work must establish a
baseline which (1) supports user needs and (2) is

(2) Establish cost targets and contingencies
A tailored design-to-cost approach should be
implemented where specific cost goals are as
signed, ownership assumed, designs traded and
cost maintained within these target values while
still meeting technical requirements. Adequate
cost reserves should be established and used
very judicially. For the most part, cost increases
in one area must be offset by reductions in other
areas. A concerted effort should be made to
instill in all NLS participants the idea that the
challenge of cost containment can be met. Ap
propriate rewards and incentives would have to
be incorporated at all levels to motivate partici
pants. Education and training programs would
be required to influence, or perhaps even change,
individual mind-sets in order to achieve the de
sired results.
(3) Establish cost containment management
systems, controls and reporting requirements
Program management processes, tools and tech
niques that are currently being used would have
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to be augmented with new and innovative ideas.
In this enlightened age it is now possible to
develop interactive cost, technical and schedule
reporting, planning, tracking and control man
agement systems complete with projected alter
natives and options and their associated risks
and costs. Problems could thus be identified and
fixed early before they create "show stoppers".
Likewise, resources could be allocated to the
choke points and technical and management tal
ent directed to the high priority tasks.

(4) Perform tracking, analyses, assessment
and evaluations.
Cost containment cannot be accomplished from
tracking and statusing alone. Nor can it be ac
complished if cost, technical and schedule are
dealt with as individual entities. This step pro
vides the data and recommendations used for
NLS program decisions and problem resolutions.
The program control tools, procedures and pro
cesses, cost estimating models, and the program
status and tracking system would be used to
manage the NLS program, identify potential prob
lems and to develop alternative approaches. The
baseline would be in the form of a logic network
model, resourced, time phased and risk quanti
fied. Individual nodes with the greatest risk
would be analyzed for alternative approaches to
eliminate or abate risk. Development of alterna
tive approaches would be a continuous process.
Network modeling and simulations would re
veal areas of greatest risk to cost and schedule. In
addition, trend analyses would reveal unfavor
able cost or schedule trends which would be
evaluated. Potential problems would also be
identified from such sources as program reviews
and program documentation or from the pro
gram status tracking effort. From these, alterna
tive approaches would be developed and iter
ated until the most suitable approach is attained
within cost containment consideration. Of course,
the key to identifying alternative approaches lies
not in the automated system or model but in the
"human element"; the ability of the engineer/
analyst to identify those areas where risk may be

excessive and to formulate alternative solutions.
(5) Make timely, informed decisions.
Containing cost while maintaining program con
tinuity is a difficult undertaking. However, deci
sion making when supported by timely and ac
curate data, trades studies, and risk analyses as
described above, would become a far less hazardous( and sometimes, haphazardous) en
deavor. It still would require experience, com
mon sense, management and technical judge
ment — and the ability to say "no" to good ideas
and proposals if they exceed the program's re
quirements or costs. Given these attributes, plus
immediate access to valid, timely and concise
data, NLS technical and management personnel
can provide this nation a needed and cost effec
tive new launch system.
BOTTOM LINE
NLS must take full advantage of the "age of
information" in which we live and use this infor
mation to plan, to execute and, if necessary, to
change. NLS must begin with well-grounded
requirements which are consistent with user
needs and operability considerations optimized
to acceptable low cost solutions. NLS must stay
the course with cost, technical and schedule in
terlocked and armed with good data to support
every decision.

Cost containment has never been easy. Cost
containment will never be very easy. But cost
containment within acceptable limits is achievable
with good data, good tools, good people and determi
nation.

The views and opinions expressed by the
author in this paper are his own and are based
on his 30 years of experience in aerospace
cost estimating and analysis. They do not
necessarily reflect any official position of
ARI, USBI, NASA or the U.S. Air Force.
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